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Abstract 
 
The paper examines how startup organizations integrate strategies to achieve 
ambidexterity through an inductive study of three ventures in the Chinese education-technology 
industry. The paper utilizes a multicultural perspective on the nature of ambidexterity and 
contributes a conceptual framework of how startups in China sustain long-term competitive 
advantage through strategy integration. 
The concept of ambidexterity focuses on balancing the tensions between two strategic 
approaches: exploration (of new opportunities) vs. exploitation (of one’s core business). While 
existing literature illustrates the importance and challenges attaining ambidexterity given 
resource-constraints, there is limited examination on how startups integrate strategies to balance 
this tension. I thus ask: How can startups in China effectively integrate strategies to balance the 
tension between explorative and exploitative approaches? What are the specific building blocks 
of strategies implemented by these startups? 
This study follows an inductive grounded theory approach to build theory on how 
startups integrate strategies to attain ambidexterity. With an inductive research process, the study 
is exploratory: I study three ventures in a nascent industry in China—education technology (“ed-
tech”) —to uncover patterns and interrelationships between theoretical constructs that emerged 
from the qualitative data. The three startups share similar founding timelines, size, and business 
offerings. I conducted onsite observations and semi-structured interviews, which served as the 
main source of data. I complemented this hand collected data with archival data (e.g. news 
articles) about the companies and industry.  
I find that startups utilize structural approaches to effectively integrate strategies and I 
inductively uncover three common integration mechanisms. While previous studies suggest that 
strategic tensions are balanced at the firm level, I go within the firm and find that differing levels 
of management (executive and frontline level) utilize different structures for integration and have 
differing strategic focus. While the executive level focuses on exploration as well as on 
integration, the frontline level is structurally independent and is primarily exploitation-oriented. 
To integrate these two approaches together, I find that startups commonly employ three 
mechanisms: (1) at the cognitive level, startups form a collectivist organizational identity so that 
employees with different roles still feel that they are all working towards the same common end-
goal; (2) at the organizational structure level, startups use some variation of a "Strategy & 
Planning" department to manage the functional processes of redirect firm strategy while 
maintaining core firm focus; and (3) at the organizational design level, startups construct reward 
systems to align incentives for strategic integration within the startup. This unique approach 
enables each of employees to maximize their resources and capabilities, thus pushing the firm to 
sustain its competitive advantage. 
Synthesizing all parts together, these findings shed light on how executive and frontline 
levels of startups interact throughout strategy integration. Overall, by engaging in intensive field 
work to go inside the “black box” of the firm, this paper provides a rich, process-oriented 
perspective on how startups integrate conflicting tensions (exploration vs exploitation) to achieve 
long-term success in nascent markets. I hope that with the growth of quantitative “big data”, the 
theoretical framework that I present can be tested in future research.  
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Introduction 
 
The role of entrepreneurship in China has received increasing examination. 
Entrepreneurship is critical for the economic development of China as its economic model 
transitioned from central planning with large state-owned enterprises to a socialist market 
economy along with the growth of the private sector (Li H, 2006). Analyzing the 
entrepreneurship landscape in China is crucial to understanding the Chinese economy, which 
highlights the importance of this research.  
One theme in entrepreneurship research focuses on cognitive and sociopolitical 
legitimacy of startups. For example, existing studies discussed how startups employ strategies to 
break into the market and stay competitive (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). A second theme of 
research focuses on examining the interfirm network outcomes, with the emphasis on resource 
dependence and social networks built within the organization (Xin et al, 2002). This study is 
building upon the second strand of the research on within-firm networks, as how startups 
navigate the tension between strategic approaches (exploration vs exploitation) in order to attain 
success. I thus ask: How can startups in China effectively integrate strategies to balance the 
tension between explorative and exploitative approaches? What are the specific building blocks 
of strategies implemented by these startups? 
Current strategy research studies focused on emerging markets and types of strategies 
used by startups to transform the traditional market (Wiegmann, 2017). This paper extends 
resource-based theory to entrepreneurial actors through examining types of strategies used by 
startups and how they integrate various strategies to establish and eventually sustain their 
competitive advantage (Ott, T. E., Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2017). This paper closely examines 
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the strategy formation processes generating cognitive, relational and resource structures for firms 
to dominate nascent markets.  
After examining existing literature, there are multiple definitions of entrepreneurship: 
One among existing studies is the "context-dependent social process through which individuals 
and teams create wealth by bringing together unique packages of resources to exploit 
marketplace opportunities" (Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton, 2001, pg. 50). Entrepreneurs pushed 
the growth of a country’s economy by creating employment opportunities and increase GDP 
growth, expanding the public’s access to wealth through opportunities provided by market 
competition (Baumol, 2007). Entrepreneurship studies focus on two main stages: how startups 
break into the nascent market and how these firms survive in the long-term. (Wan, F., 
Williamson, P., & Yin, E., 2014, June 21). The paper focuses on the second stage of studies 
through evaluating the strategy integration process by entrepreneurs to survive in the long-term.  
This study closely examines what type of strategies drive startups to balance the two 
strategic tensions. Historically, nascent industries have faced several challenges: unstructured 
market environment, unclear product definitions and ambiguous industry structure (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). The concept of ambiguity is due to unknown causal relationships among 
institutional actors and the market, making industry environment more difficult for startups to 
thrive. Nascent markets often lack clear industry structures, with ambiguous views on customers, 
competitors and suppliers (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Therefore, integrative strategies are 
important for startups to survive amidst market uncertainty and this field has been understudied 
by existing literature. This study aims to unpack the gap within existing studies and look at how 
startup firms integrate strategies to overcome such challenges. Ambidexterity has been 
emphasized in this study because it is one of the solutions to startup firms as they are navigating 
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through market ambiguity, which is the central research question the paper is attempting to 
answer.   
 
Existing Literature and Studies on Ambidexterity 
 After analyzing existing literature work, the organizational ambidexterity appeared as a 
key strategy research topic. In 1996, Tushman and O’Reilly defined organizational ambidexterity 
as “The ability to simultaneously pursue both incremental and discontinuous innovation...from 
hosting multiple contradictory structures, processes, and cultures within the same firm in order 
to survive in the long-term” (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). In the relevant field, the concept of 
organizational ambidexterity has been referenced frequently as ventures faced dual demands of 
exploration and exploration to survive competitive market environment (O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008). In order to survive in the changing environment of nascent markets, it is also essential for 
startups to integrate both new and existing assets to achieve long term capabilities. Due to the 
intense changing market environment in China, not only mature businesses but also startup firms 
need to achieve ambidexterity for long-term success.  
The ambidexterity initiative is broken down into two dimensions: experimentation and 
exploitation processes. The first dimension is focused on exploration process to develop new 
strategy to resolve issues for future market opportunities. Central questions included: how do 
firms translate experiential knowledge into strategy? How are experiments created? The second 
dimension is focused on exploitation process to refine existing business offerings. Central 
questions included: how do firms translate current operational capabilities into strategy? 
(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013).  
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In real world business settings, the success of ambidexterity has remained in questions. 
For example, very few organizations have the capabilities to afford to support independent 
structures to focus solely on exploration. But the economy crisis drove many firms to focus on 
firm efficiency and cost control, which in turn decrease the investment on explorative approach 
(Li, 2013.). Other studies also suggested that firm being successful in a single dimension is 
extremely difficult. Manuel Hensmans and colleagues investigated 215 of the largest publicly 
listed UK firms over a period of 20 years (1084 to 2003). Their research objective was looking at 
how well these firms will survive in the long term while running the existing business model 
more efficiently. Out of the 215 firms, they found that only 28 of the companies were able to 
consistently perform at the frontier over the two decades (achieving both explorative and 
exploitative dimensions). Therefore, many firms have experienced failures due to inconsistent 
alignments. Such failure is inevitable without the integration of both initiatives (Kirzner, 1979). 
The integrative method is essential to overcome the trade-offs between explorative and 
exploitative dimensions and push the firm to achieve the optimal balance known as the 
ambidexterity. The concept of ambidexterity has remained underdeveloped in the academia 
space, since many are uncertain about how exactly startups utilize ambidexterity and what are 
the forces behind the strategy integration process: whether the process is cognitive, whether parts 
of the organization are divided based on the different strategic approaches, whether firms focus 
on exploitative then the explorative dimension, whether current departments and new 
departments remain separate from each other, or whether startup firm protect new units while 
preserving the existing cultural norms of old business. Through comparative case study of three 
most famous education technology company in China, this paper hopes to shed lights on the 
strategic management in startups in China from the perspective of ambidexterity. 
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Historical Background: Entrepreneurship Environment in China 
The research setting of this study builds upon the setting of entrepreneurship landscape in 
China. During the Mao era (1949-1976), entrepreneurship was completely eradicated with 
negative social perceptions towards the occupation. The public often referred “entrepreneurs” as 
those who had criminal records and thus unable to find a job (Harding H, 1987). But in recent 
years, China is viewed as the most entrepreneur-friendly country in the world: the world’s 
second largest producer of “unicorns” (non-listed companies that are valued over $1Bn) followed 
the United States. A report by the China’s Ministry of Science and Technology found that there 
are 115 university science parks and over 1,600 technology business across the country. The 
incubators for startups provided mentorship, office space and funding support to new generations 
of entrepreneurs (Kshetri, N., 2007). A telephone poll conducted with 463 communications, 49% 
of the respondents agreed that China provided resources and support to be the world’s next 
technological innovator (Puffer, S. M., McCarthy, D. J., & Boisot, M., 2010, May). Only 21% of 
the respondents agreed that “the next Bill Gates” will come from the United States but majority 
agreed that it will come from China. A survey conducted among the public in China found that 
70% respondents claimed entrepreneurship was a good career path (Kshetri, N., 2007).  
The first wave of economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping spurred the first generation of 
entrepreneurs in the 1980s. The entrepreneurs were made up of pioneers who lacked access to 
relevant education and knowledge but simply wanted to start their own businesses. During that 
time, government support was limited and no remedies were provided if their business ventures 
failed (Tse, E., 2016). In late 1990s, Internet giants, such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu, entered 
the Internet market. The growth of Internet industry sparked the growth of entrepreneurs in 
various industries: energy, healthcare, financial services, consumer, and retail, where businesses 
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where technology became the main strategic focus in all startup firms (Wright M, Liu X, Buck T, 
2008). China’s new generation of entrepreneurs is made up of younger and highly well-educated, 
aged from 25-34. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) report pointed out that China has 
a high proportion of young entrepreneurs, with 57 percent between 18 and 34 (Xavier SR, Kelley 
D, Kew J., 2013). One prevalent trend is the increasing population of overseas returnee 
entrepreneurs: highly-educated individuals who were trained in developed countries and returned 
to China to start technology ventures (Ahlstrom, D., & Ding, Z., 2014). They brought back 
western organizational culture influence which will be discussed in the later section of the paper 
as their backgrounds have huge influence on the strategy integration used by startups in China. 
In recent years, the CCP (Communist Party of China) has made multiple public 
acknowledgements regarding to the benefits and impact entrepreneurship had on the economy. In 
addition, both the Chinese government and society perceived “entrepreneur” as a stable career 
path, where they were given numerous opportunities to move up the social ladder, such as being 
introduced into the inner circle of the party and playing important roles in the government policy 
implementation process (Luo, 2005). The party and societal approval of the entrepreneur position 
further supported Deng Xiaoping’s famous ideology: “To be rich is to be glorious,” which 
encouraged increasing household income and improving social well-being through the 
entrepreneurship path (Tse, E., 2016). The nation has undergone significant economic, political 
and legal reforms to continue supporting the entrepreneurship expansion in China, which 
increases the significance of this study as the findings are influential to the nation’s economy. 
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The Importance of Strategy Integration: The Role of Rebuilding Startup Organizational 
Culture in China 
Internally, startup organizations in China are re-engineering organizational culture to 
formulate strategies and better challenge the incumbents. Christensen defined the organizational 
culture as the “culture that affects and regulates the way members of the organization think, feel, 
and act within the framework of that organization” (Christensen, Clayton M., 1997). Historically, 
organizational culture has been examined, some being unique to the Chinese business context. 
For example, Xin et al. (2002) study identified the five attributes of organizational culture in 
Chinese SOEs. The five dimensions are related to both external adaptation and internal 
integration function: employee development, harmony, customer orientation, social 
responsibility and innovation. When the study by Xin et al. (2002) is informative in terms of 
organizational culture in Chinese SOEs, it provided limited information on whether these 
dimensions are applicable to startup organizations in China and their impact on firm strategy. 
When examining the organizational culture in China, the concept of Guanxi is often 
referenced. Chinese people often refer Guanxi as a part of the core cultural value that emphasizes 
on the importance of personal relationships in the business world, including connections between 
corporations and government officials. Existing literature highlighted that the network outcomes 
formed by a firm’s organizational culture have direct relationship with the perceived firm 
performance (Wiegmann, T., 2017, October 26). Organizational culture is a meaningful resource 
deployed by firms to sustain their competitive advantage and potentially a point of differentiation 
with the incumbent firms, which startup firms often integrate to their strategies. 
Prior research has shown that overseas Chinese returnees played critical roles in 
promoting new organizational culture within the entrepreneurship landscape, which is a unique 
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phenomenon dominating the current market trend in China. The previous managerial practices 
and culture framework were heavily influenced by the traditional Chinese values: collectivism 
and shared identity of the group to achieve social harmony, which stemmed from Confucianism 
and Taoism. The organizational system is based upon the values of hard work, loyalty and 
dedication, but placed limited emphasis on individual thinking and innovation (Wiegmann, T., 
2017, October 26). While individualistic values were promoted in the West, the Chinese 
employees are encouraged to act for the greater benefit of the group and always prioritize 
organization before individual goals. This ideology was extended to explain the organizational 
structure of Chinese companies, where hierarchy is more predominant and junior employees 
should not question or challenge their superior with rare occasions of disagreements (Tsui, A. S., 
Wang, H., & Xin, K. R., 2006). 
Interestingly, with the nation’s political system being a top-down planned economy 
approach, its new leading entrepreneurial companies, adopted their mindset and culture from 
western organizational culture, especially the Silicon Valley region. One founder of entrepreneur 
firm claimed that the culture of his startup is much closer to the west coast of United States that 
to Beijing (Tse, E., 2016). The Chinese returnees introduced Western level of risk taking and 
promoted innovation among the firm. The rising Chinse startups also encouraged flat hierarchy 
within the organizations to stimulate innovative ideas, which marked the shift to the western 
organizational style from traditional Chinese firm style. The startup leaders have fused their 
organizational culture values with western influence, each affecting one another and creating a 
different culture framework, which eventually become one of the startup firms’ key resources 
within the strategy integration process. 
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Evaluating the Education Technology Startup Landscape  
The paper used education technology market as a sample industry to examine the evolved 
driving strategic forces behind ambidexterity. The traditional education industry is based on 
classroom settings: simply with blackboard and a teacher that provided afterschool tutoring to 
students. The industry has been disrupted by the rise of education technology, such as digital 
online teaching platforms and new educational technologies, where students can participate in 
tutoring sessions online, upload homework through portal and even learn concepts through 3D 
immersion (Tse, E., 2016). The disruption rate of education technology is the highest in the Asia 
market, especially China. Since Education technology platform is one of the fastest growing 
industries in China, this research will utilize the digital education landscape to answer the central 
research question: How do startups integrate strategies to achieve ambidexterity in the China 
market? 
In 2016, global investments in Chinese education technology companies rose to $1.2 
billion, which was more than triple the amount raised in 2014 and comparable to Lyft’s most 
recent funding round. The report indicated that the education technology industry in China is 
expected to grow 20 percent annually (Nataf, E. 2018, January 19). One rationale for the 
expansion of education technology startups in China is its constantly growing student population 
and traditional cultural values that placed heavy emphasis on education. The Asian education 
system is the largest market globally: more than 600 million students are enrolled in K-12 
schools in Asia, which is 10 times more than the student population in the United States. China’s 
young population is the highest in the world with a population of 269 million (Tse, E., 2016). 
What added to the growth of Education technology market is that education is generally deeply 
valued in traditional Chinese culture. The educational services are where Chinese families spent 
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the most income on besides housing and medical services. Studies have pointed out the desire to 
invest in children’s futures and pressure on family to send children into prestigious universities 
increased their willingness to pay on education. The shift from traditional education industry to 
digital education platform also indicated the shift of revenue from traditional incumbent 
education companies to education technology startup companies in China. The focus on 
education and rising target student population played a significant role in driving the acceleration 
of education technology industry in China. 
Since 1998, China’s online education providers existed but the market did not start to 
grow until the 2011-2013 period. The China’s online learning market successfully disrupted the 
traditional education market and continued to expand. For example, the Education technology 
industry grew from 500 startup companies to 4200 in 2016. The China Online Education Report 
(2015-2020) claimed that the number of students studying online in 2014 was 77,097 million, 
composed of only 30% of the student population in China ((Ahlstrom, D., & Ding, Z., 2014). 
The market is far from reaching its peak and more firms are entering the market to exploit the 
remaining 70% target population. The education technology startup organizations have utilized 
network expansion strategy to align with government objectives in order to gain support from the 
formal institution. With the Chinese major economy model shifting from manufacture-based 
economy to service-based one, more emphasis is placed on stimulating growth of the online 
education market. The Chinese government indicated that its 13th Five-Year Plan is aimed to 
modernize the education system and focus on the growth of online education. In 2015, the 
Chinese government invested $1.07 billion in education technology startups. It will invest $30 
billion in the industry by 2020, with the goal to provide all K-12 schools with resources and 
increase the student-to-computer ratio of 6:1 within the three-year period. The strong support by 
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the party and state-supported venture capitalists also encouraged the entrance of private funds 
into the industry and bringing more private startup players into the landscape to accelerate the E-
learning revolution in China (Nataf, E., 2018, January 19). The increasing number of entrants 
into the industry further increased the intra-industry competition, pushing all education 
technology startups to frame and integrate strategies to expand into new markets as well as 
sustaining their existing business model. 
 
Methodology 
The paper used an inductive research process with grounded theory approach to explore 
the forces behind China’s entrepreneurship expansion and how startups integrate various 
strategies to achieve ambidexterity (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The potential strategy formation 
and integration included but not limited to: dual emphasis on achieving breakthroughs 
(exploration) and incremental gains from existing product offerings (exploitation), establishment 
of organizational culture framework, and interaction approach among all levels of management. 
The data were collected, compared and analyzed based on existing inductive studies, which will 
be discussed in the “data analysis” section (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
The research methodology was based on in-depth fieldwork that I conducted on three 
education technology startup ventures in China: their names were coded as firm A, B, and C to 
ensure confidentiality. Before the interviews and firm visits, a one-page confidentiality form was 
sent to, reviewed and signed by the interviewees. The confidentiality form was established to 
ensure firm interviewees give the most candid responses throughout the data collection process 
(See Appendix I).  
I studied more than three ventures but eventually chose these three ventures for the 
following reasons: In the beginning of data collection process, I interviewed more than three 
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ventures but did not include them in the paper. The ventures that were not chosen provided the 
same business service offerings as the three sample ventures, such as English tutoring or career 
recruiting services for Chinese international students. But they were not based in metropolitan 
cities in China and onsite interviews or firm visits were difficult, as I was not able to get enough 
number of responses to identify potential patterns for the study. Another reason was that these 
startup firms were founded after 2018 and still have not developed a clear organizational 
structure with limited size to be examined and to provide insights for this study.  I ended up 
choosing the three sample ventures due to the following reasons: The timing is attractive of these 
firms as these three startups were founded within similar time frame (2013-2017). They also 
provided similar business offerings and had similar profile size. Table 1 provided descriptions of 
the startup ventures. Onsite observations and interviews with firms were recorded and analyzed 
to examine strategy integration the startups used to stay competitive in the market. 
 
Table 1: Description of Ventures 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Business Focus K-12 after-school 
English tutoring 
services 
  
Overseas exams 
preparation (Ex: SAT, 
ACT, GRE, etc) 
 
Focus shifted to online 
education since 2015 
 
Full-service career 
consulting company 
 
Provides 1-on-1 career 
workshop, career panel 
targeting Chinese 
international students 
English tutoring 
services 
 
Overseas college 
application 
preparation  
Headquarter 
Location 
Beijing, China Chengdu, China Shenzhen, China 
Year Founded 2013 2015 2018 
Professional 
Investment Attempts 
Series B funding 
round 
Series A funding round Pre-Seed funding 
stage 
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Prior Corporate 
Leadership 
Experience of Senior 
Executive Level 
Managers and senior 
executives at public 
companies in the 
education industry 
Managers and senior 
executives at public 
companies in the 
education industry and 
investment banks 
Managers at 
public companies 
in the education 
industry 
Number of 
Employees 
250 frontline 
employees 
 
1000+ teachers 
150 frontline employees 
 
2000+ global mentors 
15 frontline 
employees 
 
100 mentors in 
Southern China 
region 
 
 Data Collection 
The primary data sources were: interviews, onsite visit notes, and follow-up phone calls 
to access firm strategies. The secondary data sources were: news articles, internal documents, 
company strategic plans, meeting notes, and company profiles, etc. I held a round of 30 
interviews on average from January 2019 to February 2019. The interviews were semi-structured 
and ranged from 30 to 45 minutes, conducted in first language of interviewees (Mandarin 
Chinese) to ensure participants were expressing their thoughts and knowledge comfortably and 
accurately, ultimately avoiding any cultural ambiguity. The responses were recorded, transcribed 
and then translated into English for further data evaluation. During the process, I manually 
transcribed the interview responses to identify relationships between the information categories 
through axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Table 2 provided an overview of the number of 
interviews conducted with all three sample startup ventures. The table also illustrated a 
breakdown of relevant titles of interviewees at the startup ventures to give a holistic view on the 
data collection process. 
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Table 2: Cases and Interviews per Startup Firm and Breakdown of Relevant Titles of 
Interviewees at the Ventures1 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Interview Structure Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Semi-structured 
Interviews & Onsite 
Observations 
Semi-structured 
Interviews & Onsite 
Observations 
Number of 
Interviewees from 
The Executive 
Level 
Interview responses 
from executives: 2 
 
Interview responses 
from executives: 5 
 
Interview responses 
from executives: 4 
 
Job Titles of 
Interviewees from 
The Employee 
Level 
 COO (1) 
 CAO (1) 
 CEO (1) 
 COO (1) 
 CTO (1) 
 CAO (2) 
 CEO (1) 
 COO (1) 
 CTO (1) 
 CFO (1) 
Number of 
Interviewees from 
The Frontline Level 
Interview responses 
from employees: 6 
 
Interview responses 
from employees: 7 
 
Interview responses 
from employees: 6 
Job Titles of 
Interviewees from 
The Frontline Level 
 VP of 
Marketing 
Department 
(2) 
 VP of 
Strategy and 
Planning 
Department 
(1) 
 Employee of 
Human 
Resources (2) 
 Employee of 
R&D 
Department 
(1) 
 Employee of 
Strategy 
Department 
(3) 
 VP of 
Marketing 
Department 
(1) 
 VP of R&D 
Department 
(2) 
 Employee of 
Marketing 
Department 
(1) 
 Director of 
Academic 
Resources 
Department 
(1) 
 Employee of 
Academic 
Resources 
Department 
(1) 
 Employee of 
Strategy and 
Planning 
Department 
(2) 
 VP of 
Marketing 
Department 
(1) 
 Employee of 
Marketing 
                                                 
 
1 Besides the executives and employees of the three startup ventures, I met and interviewed external stakeholders, 
such as professionals working in the education technology industry to throughout the networking and data collection 
process. Throughout the process, I was able to expand understanding of startup strategies and market dynamics and 
added new insights to this paper. 
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Department 
(1) 
Total Number of 
Interviews of 
Executive Level and 
Employee Level 
8 12 10 
Archival Sources Semi-structured 
responses from 
executives: 2 
 
Semi-structured 
responses from 
employees: 6 
 
Internal 
presentations: 3 
 
Meeting notes: 8 
 
Strategic plans: 2 
 
Company profiles: 4 
 
Conference call 
notes: 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured 
responses from 
executives: 5 
 
Semi-structured 
responses from 
employees: 7 
 
Onsite visit 
observations: 1 
 
Internal 
presentations: 5 
 
Company profiles: 4 
 
Conference call 
notes: 2 
 
Strategic plans: 3 
 
 
Semi-structured 
responses from 
executives: 4 
 
Semi-structured 
responses from 
employees: 6 
 
Onsite visit 
observations: 1 
 
Meeting notes: 6 
 
Company profiles:7 
 
Strategic plans: 2 
 
Conference call 
notes: 2 
 
Despite the insights that Chinese education technology startups can offer, many scholars 
been having difficulties accessing to these startups in mainland China. First, many startups are 
linked to or mainly funded by the Chinese government. As a result, many employees are not 
willing to sharing their experiences due to the political environment. Second, the Chinese market 
and society are based heavily on Guanxi, or social connections or personal interactions. 
Therefore, startups rarely give open interview or onsite visit opportunities unless there is a 
personal relationship built between the me and people within the firm.  
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The author of this article was born and lived in China for twelve years and has personal 
connections with a few education technology startups prior to the research. She taught SAT at 
another startup firm her freshman summer in college and is currently working as a part-time 
mentor at one of the recruiting service startups. Her former employers introduced her to 
employees of the three sample education technology startups. After four weeks of intensive 
networking in January 2019, the firms finally accepted my interview requests, ultimately 
enabling the data collection process to kick off. All three startup ventures fit the profile of 
education technology startups discussed above; they are well-known to customers and are 
playing important roles in the education space in China.  
Even though these startup ventures provided various tutoring or recruitment consulting 
services to customers, but they all followed a similar organizational structure, as presented in 
Figure 1. Each startup has a CEO or Chairman, that leads the senior management team. There are 
various functional departments located at the headquarters along with the senior management 
team, such as finance, human resources and R&D department. Then there are administrative 
units under each department in other office locations. These administrative unites are labeled as 
employees because they are connecting the firm with students, while being geographically closer 
to the client (student) sites. The final level of employees are part of the frontline frontline level2, 
classified as career mentors or teachers that are directly providing the education services to 
students. They often cooperate closely with employees from administrative units to update 
student learning statuses while employees check on teachers regularly to ensure quality services 
                                                 
 
2 Since the three sample ventures are currently in early development stage, there is no clear distinction between 
frontline and frontline levels, as all frontline levels are responsible for frontline firm activities and operations. 
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to clients. Such organizational structure was further examined to generate theories on strategy 
integration process. 
 
Figure 1: Organizational Structure Chart of Startup Ventures 
  
I held a round of the 30 interviews with the founders and executives of startups to 
examine strategic development at the executive level. I listed a breakdown of interviewees and 
their relevant titles at the sample startups (See Table 2). After the initial interviews, I also 
identified and scheduled interviews with employees across various departments based on the 
following criteria: (1) tenure in the firm, which would provide a more comprehensive perspective 
on the firm’s strategic decisions; (2) Degree of involvement with firm strategic implementation 
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and their interaction with executive level; (3)  Use of diverse and multiple internal employees 
will mitigate the potential biases of their responses while giving broader insights on the firm’s 
strategy integration process to achieve ambidexterity.  
The first part of interview are composed of broad open-ended questions. Table 3 provided 
a list of detailed leading questions during the interviews. The questions were targeted towards 
participants to provide a holistic view on the competitive landscape of education technology in 
China and how the firm strategized to enter the nascent market. Then more in-depth questions 
were modified and asked to access the firm’s strategy integration process: how executive and 
frontline levels were integrated to better execute the firm’s strategy and how was the firm 
positioning itself to achieve ambidexterity. The interview questions were constantly modified 
based on participants’ responses in order to capture more findings for the paper. 
 
Table 3: Interview Leading Questions 
General Questions: 
What is the strategic focus of your company? 
What is your perspective on the competitive landscape of education technology startups? 
Can you describe the historical development of your company? 
How does your startup differentiate with other platforms in the industry? 
Organizational Structure and Culture Related Questions: 
What is the organizational structure of the firm? 
What kind of roles do you think executive level and frontline level play in your organization? 
How are upper executive and lower frontline levels different? 
What % of company executive level and frontline employees are overseas returnees? 
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How would you describe the firm’s organizational culture and identity? 
What type of impact do overseas returnees have on the organizational culture? 
What are major activities of senior executives and frontline employees? 
 
The organizational structure of the startup organizations was drawn to better illustrate the 
organizational culture. Then I formulated questions during interviews to access the employee and 
founder ratings of the organizational culture based on five cultural dimensions mentioned in the 
earlier part of paper: employee development, harmony, customer orientation, social 
responsibility and innovation (Xin et al., 2002). I conducted interviews and participated in onsite 
visits to further evaluate the organizational structure of each venture to access each firm’s 
cultural framework and identity formation process. The interviewees provided insights into how 
each level of management responded to a firm strategy and whether the proportion of overseas 
returnees in each level would affect the firm strategy direction and organizational culture. 
Through analyzing the internal cultural framework, I inferred how each level contributed to the 
firm’s ability to achieve ambidexterity. 
After February 2019, I followed up with the first-round interviewees to evaluate their 
thoughts on how interaction among different levels of the firm has helped their firms to integrate 
strategies. The second round of the interview was conducted in the form of follow-up phone calls 
with a focus on specific strategy questions prompted by the interviewer: in which strategic 
decision the interviewee was directly involved in: exploration or exploitation. The questions 
emphasized on facts, events and interpretations of strategies as well as resources used by startup 
firms to attain ambidexterity. Table 4 provided a list of detailed leading questions during the 
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round of follow-up interviews. The participants provided complementary information on the 
strategy integration process, which provided space for potential reconstruction of theories. 
 
Table 4: Follow-Up Phone Call Leading Questions 
Strategy Integration Process and Ambidexterity Questions: 
What type of external and internal strategies has your firm implemented to stay competitive in 
the market environment? 
How did you integrate all types of strategies? 
How did you integrate upper and lower level of management? 
Would you describe the firm’s strategy implementation approach as top-bottom or bottom-up? 
If so, can you describe the process? 
“How has different levels of your company interacted to yield network outcomes? If so, what 
were the direct impact?” 
How do you form ties and keep employees informed of firm strategy within the organization? 
How does your firm strategize to achieve incremental gains with existing processes while 
exploring potential opportunities and markets? 
How does each business unit/department reinforce each other to support and execute the 
firm’s strategy? 
 
 
Data Analysis 
 The data analysis process was divided into three stages that supported each other to 
provide a comprehensive perspective into the topic. It followed the procedure suggested by 
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Corbin and Strauss (1990). By using “open coding,” I identified the information categories and 
by “axial coding,” and identified the relationships between the categories. Then I created the 
grounded theoretical model to depict the interrelationships of the axial coding categories of 
information.  
The three stages are divided into the following: First, through referencing to existing 
literature work, I confirmed that the three education technology startups chosen fit the 
description of startup ventures in China, as their major goal was to achieve ambidexterity for 
market competition advantage and long-term development. Second, I followed Eisenhardt’s 
(2009) inductive study methods to analyze the firm’s responses, compared them, summarize 
common trends to identify: how exactly do these firms integrate strategies and how do they 
balance the tensions between exploration and exploitation. Third, I continued adjusting and 
validating interview questions with additional information from the interviews. In fact, the 
responses and firm visits offered new insights and I decided to expand beyond the original 
research question and asked, What are specific building blocks of strategies implemented by 
these startups? Then I inferred from the data collected and triangulated themes from each stage 
to summarize into a theoretical framework presented in the next section. 
 
Findings 
What are the strategic differences between executive and frontline level? 
Finding 1. All executive level employees took an explorative approach (instead of exploitative 
approach) and focused on expansion beyond current market opportunities 
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After I interviewed a total of 11 senior executives from all three sample ventures, a 
common pattern was found as their strategic focus lied upon changing-the-business model and 
creating long-term vision and future plan for the company development. According to their 
internal meeting notes, most discussions centered around new market initiatives, projects and 
tactical programs to pursue innovation byond current product and service offerings. These 
objectives were closer to long-term vision and increased future value for the organization, with 
less focus on tangible operational objectives and existing offerings. 
The fact that more than 50% of the founders or senior executives were composed of 
overseas returnees while more than 50% of the frontline level are made up of employees from 
local settings (See Table 5). Table 5 provided an overview of the profile of the sample ventures 
and the percentage of overseas returnees in each management level based on interviews and 
company reports given to me.  
 
Table 5: Breakdown of Key Executives and % of Overseas Returnees at Each Firm Level 
Venture Key Executives in 
Fundraising 
% of Overseas 
Returnees in 
Executive Level 
% of Overseas Returnees 
in Frontline Employee 
Level 
Firm A CEO, Chairman, CFO, COO, 
CTO 
90% 10% 
Firm B CEO, CFO, CAO (Chief 
Academic Officer), COO, 
CTO 
100% 12% 
Firm C CEO, CAO, CFO, COO 95% 5% 
 
According to Table 3, one fundamental difference between the executive level and 
frontline level was their cultural differences, both influenced by their education backgrounds and 
work experiences. With the shift towards western startup culture and organizational style on 
innovation and risk-taking, the senior executive level’s business mindset was mainly about 
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changing-the-business model, with a strategic focus on long-term growth of the firm. During the 
interview, one of the executives of firm A mentioned, “I would say our level (executive level) 
has western-oriented culture, which is great to provide the firm with new perspectives to focus 
on.” With their previous abroad education experiences, their main function was explorative in 
nature: establishing growth incubator, new venture under the startup, new line of business 
offerings (protecting it as it evolved), and market expansion beyond mainland China to overseas 
markets (such as to North America and Europe regions). One major strategic focus of the senior 
level is expanding the startup firm market beyond mainland China. Table 5 illustrated the 
interviews conducted within the senior management team and relevant archival sources 
associated with the quotes and underlying themes. 
 
Table 6: Representative Data Supporting Interpretations of Strategic Approaches Across 
Management Levels (Executive Level) 
 Mechanisms for Explorative Strategic Approaches 
 Learning Execution Resource 
Recombination 
Definition Executives 
discovering new 
market opportunities 
Integrated executive 
team work to resolve 
any conflicting 
viewpoints 
 
Triggered top-bottom 
approach to execute 
the consensus 
strategy 
Share and distribute 
resources, such as 
funding, expertise, 
and network 
Rationale The overseas 
experience drove the 
upper level’s strategic 
focus towards 
changing-the-
business model 
 
Strategic intention to 
disrupt current 
business model and 
protect growth of 
new startup line until 
turning into mature 
business line 
Maximize resources 
of the integrated 
senior team to 
achieve shared vision 
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Example from Firm 
A 
“For my job, I spent 
most of my time 
attending social 
engagement 
(Yingchou). China is 
a real relationship-
based society.” 
 
- COO 
“It is the long-term 
growth of company 
that is chiefly 
pursued through 
strategy execution.” 
 
 
 
- CAO 
 
“I would say our 
level (executive level) 
has western-oriented 
culture, which is 
great to provide the 
firm with new 
perspectives to focus 
on.” 
- COO 
Example from Firm 
B 
“After ending work at 
the office, Yingchou 
is something I have to 
do to stay ahead of 
the market. Meeting 
other startup teams 
and VC people is 
important to seek new  
opportunities.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- COO 
 
“Most of our 
teachers had 
overseas experience, 
as we invested 
heavily in recruiting 
them abroad in order 
to provide the most 
authentic experiences 
to our students.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- CAO 
“When I wake up in 
the morning 
everyday, there are 
300 to 400 unread 
messages in the 
Wechat group 
(consisted of 
members within the 
senior management 
team). My job is to go 
through all the 
messages and ensure 
that I am aware of 
any senior team 
updates or ideas.”  
- CEO 
 
Example from Firm 
C 
“We often get dinner 
with other startup 
founders to see what 
they are up to and 
what are gaps in the 
market that our 
business can fill.” 
- CEO 
 
 
“We will increase 
our investment in the 
North America 
market this year. 
International students 
are our target 
customers.” 
-CFO 
“We excel in new 
ideas and human 
resources. We got a 
really creative team.” 
 
 
 
- CTO 
 
As seen in Table 6, the cultural influence from Western startups was built upon the senior 
executives’ resources and capabilities as they were able to leverage their previous overseas 
network and personal understanding of foreign markets. One common pattern from the 
interviews was that the founding members of these three sample startups were graduated from 
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the same school overseas, had similar working experiences, and returned to China to start their 
business venture together. Also influenced by their own education experiences in western 
countries, mentors and teachers, those that provided direct tutoring or consulting services to 
students, usually had personal connections with the executive level team, such as being previous 
classmates, alumni or colleagues during their overseas periods. One of the firm B executives 
recalled, “Most of our teachers had overseas experience, as we invested heavily in recruiting 
them abroad in order to provide the most authentic experiences to our students.” Their overseas 
experiences, as opposed to local frontline level, turned into the most valuable resources and 
shaped the senior strategy approach to more explorative-based. 
As shown in Table 6, another major strategy focus by the senior team was the potential 
disruption to firm’s own business model and establishment of startup branches or a new 
department in order to seek new market opportunities. After collecting qualitative data from 
interviews and follow-up phone calls, a strategy implementation process by the senior level is 
framed: learning, execution, resource recombination of growth market opportunities (See Figure 
4). When asking about the major roles of senior executives, the senior team members of firm A, 
B and C all mentioned Yingchou, usually in the forms of dinner gatherings regularly, an 
important occasion when conducting businesses in China. The occasion was designed for startup 
executive team to meet other startup executive members and venture capitalists during the dinner 
event. During the round of interview, CEO of firm B mentioned, “After ending work at the 
office, Yingchou is something I have to do to stay ahead of the market. Meeting other startup 
teams and VC people is important to seek new opportunities.” The discussions occurred during 
these networking sessions were aimed to explore new markets and recruit executive talents to the 
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startup firm, shaping the learning process of senior level. The social engagements provided new 
perspectives for the learning process as executives were discovering new market opportunities.  
 
Figure 2: Explorative Approach: Strategy Formation Process 
 
 
As seen in Figure 2, during the execution process, the senior team adopted the network 
strategy among all members and all members were integrated at the top under a distinct 
operational structure to promote content sharing and tight communication. The startup often 
relied on establishing a new venture or startup line to disrupt its own business model, ultimately 
protecting to grow the new line until it became a mature profitable business line within the 
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startup. The execution and resource recombination process will be discussed under the third 
session on structural differences between executive and frontline level. 
 
Finding 2. All frontline level employees took an exploitative approach (instead of explorative 
approach) and focused on firm’s competency in local settings 
 
Contrasted with the senior executive level, the frontline level of startup ventures served 
as the bridging function between executives and teachers while focusing on the interaction with 
external stakeholders, such as consumers and suppliers. As one of the employees of firm C 
highlighted her role in the company, “We are often told that we are the ‘voice’ of the firm, where 
we connect the firm with rest of our external stakeholders.” As Figure 1 (organizational structure 
chart) has shown, the frontline frontline level was broken down into various functional 
departments, such as operations, sales, legal and finance. Most revenue generated by frontline 
level came from running of daily business activities. As one of the employees of firm C 
addressed, “I think our work is biased towards operational logic.” Another employee of firm B 
also identified the same role, “I think our work is biased towards operational logic.” Therefore, 
the focus of lower level was on short-term financial plan and from a performance-driven 
perspective, where the frontline level also emphasized on firm efficiency, operational 
productivity and speed. Table 7 illustrated the interviews conducted within the frontline 
employee team and relevant archival sources associated with the quotes and underlying themes. 
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Table 7: Representative Data Supporting Interpretations of Strategic Approaches Among 
Management Levels (Employee Level) 
 Mechanisms for Exploitative Strategic Approaches 
 Learning Execution Resource 
Recombination 
Definition Employees focus on 
conducting 
competitor analysis 
and developing 
current firm 
operational advantage 
Structurally 
independent 
employee team come 
up with strategic plan 
as the main agenda 
for Monday meetings 
 
Applied bottom-up 
approach to execute 
the consensus 
strategy after 
approval from senior 
executive level 
Share and distribute 
resources within each 
functional department 
with reward system in 
place 
Rationale The local education 
experience drove the 
lower level’s strategic 
focus towards 
running-the-business 
model 
 
Strategic intention to 
improve existing 
business offerings 
with tight 
performance control 
within each 
functional department 
Maximize resources 
of the structurally 
independent 
departments to 
increase mutual 
adjustment 
Example from Firm 
A 
“Our main 
responsibilities 
include: market share 
analysis, current 
customer base 
expansion, and 
sustain firm 
competitive 
advantages.” 
 
 
 
-VP of strategy & 
planning department 
“We want to find 
every opportunity to 
improve our current 
business and increase 
profitability.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Employee of human 
resources 
“I graduated from a 
university here in 
Beijing. Most of my 
colleagues from the 
same department are 
former school mates. 
We worked well 
together since we are 
used to the same 
culture and have the 
same backgrounds” 
 
-VP of marketing 
department 
Example from Firm 
B 
“Among our 
competitors, our cost 
control system is the 
most efficient.” 
 
“I think our work is 
biased towards 
operational logic.” 
 
 
“The market is 
intense and always 
has been changing. 
We need to make sure 
we are always ahead 
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-Employee of 
marketing department 
 
 
 
 
 
-VP of marketing 
department 
of our competitors 
and expand our 
current market 
share.” 
 
-Employee of strategy 
department 
Example from Firm 
C 
“I joined the 
company as employee 
24 and we have 
surpassed our 
competitors at that 
time as we kept 
improving our 
services to students.” 
 
-Director of academic 
resources department 
 
“We are often told 
that we are the 
‘voice’ of the firm, 
where we connect the 
firm with rest of our 
external 
stakeholders.” 
 
 
-Employee of 
marketing department 
“We are the bridge 
between our senior 
leaders and the 
market, including 
customers and the 
government.” 
 
 
 
-VP of marketing 
department 
 
As mentioned in Table 5 before, with more than 50% of them were recruited from local 
Chinese universities and had in-depth understanding of Chinese market and teaching culture. 
During interviews with the frontline level, their main roles included but were not limited to 
creating short-term firm objectives: such as developing operational advantages of the startup, 
targeting existing markets to increase share, expanding current customer base, maintaining 
connections with governments to gain support, and sustaining competitive advantages. Their 
most valuable resources are their understanding of local markets and competitors. As one of the 
employees from firm A discussed, “I graduated from a university here in Beijing. Most of my 
colleagues from the same department are former school mates. We worked well together since 
we are used to the same culture and have the same backgrounds.” Continuing the firm 
operational advantage and create solutions through using existing resources made their strategic 
focus to be more exploitative in nature.  
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Due to their experiences with local settings and roles as the connector between firm and existing 
market, the culture framework of frontline level was also heavily influenced by the traditional 
Chinese organizational culture, with an emphasis on collectivism, risk-averse firm behavior and 
priority of social group harmony. The emphasis on dedication and group identity might limit 
individual innovation (Wiegmann, T., 2017, October 26). Such cultural difference enabled 
frontline level to drive the essential focus on efficiency and cost control side of the business as 
seen in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Exploitative Approach: Strategy Formation Process 
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In order to evaluate the frontline level’s strategy design and implementation process, I 
collected ethnographic data and visited startup to observe firm operation processes. Based on the 
evidence collected, the frontline level followed the same strategy implementation framework as 
the senior level: learning, execution, resource recombination of existing market opportunities. I 
had the opportunity to sit in two of the frontline employee weekly Monday meetings (one for 
Firm B and one for Firm C) and observed the most frequent topics that came up during these 
meetings: the major topics were market analysis, competitor comparable, fieldwork surveys to 
analyze whether the startup firm is a playing a leading role in the industry. Through focusing on 
gathering information about the startup’s current performance compared to its market 
competitors and refining the running-the-business model, the frontline level was able to shape its 
learning process about the current state of the firm. The execution and resource recombination 
process will be discussed under the third session on structural differences between the executive 
and frontline levels. 
 
What are specific building blocks of strategies implemented by these startups? 
Finding 3. Startups utilize structural approaches to effectively integrate strategies. 
While the executive level is integrative and explorative, the frontline level is structurally 
independent and exploitative. 
  
After analyzing qualitative data from interviews and onsite visits, I inferred from the data to 
categorize the differences between upper management level and lower frontline level. The 
overseas experience by returnees among the upper level drove the strategic focus towards 
changing-the-business model, influencing by Western Silicon Valley startup culture. The local 
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education backgrounds and in-depth knowledge of local settings pushed the frontline level to 
focus on the firm operational management towards running-the-business model.  
Besides the cultural component, the distinction is further expanded by the structural approach 
applied by these startups. Even though each senior team member possessed similar overseas 
academic and career backgrounds (graduated from the same schools, had similar business 
backgrounds, and started the startup business together), but each senior team member has their 
own expertise: such as talent recruitment, teaching experience, or technological development 
skills. The upper level focused on creating tight links across units, as each member would 
provide their expertise advice to rest of the team and contributing to the holistic strategy. For 
example, when I visited the sample startups onsite, the senior team held Monday meetings 
frequently and often communicated intensely among the group on Wechat, which is the most 
prevalent communication platform in China. During one of the follow-up phone calls, the COO 
of firm B addressed the tight communication pattern within the senior level, “When I wake up in 
the morning everyday, there are 300 to 400 unread messages in the Wechat group (consisted of 
members within the senior management team). My job is to go through all the messages and 
ensure that I am aware of any senior team updates or ideas.”  
To ensure the managerial structure of the top management team was completely integrated: 
the senior team would work on accepting different perspectives on distinctive strategies to 
resolve any conflicting viewpoints among the management team. Monday meetings were 
essential as senior executives engaged in open discussions on various strategic options. Once the 
consensus strategic plan is confirmed, then a top-bottom approach is triggered to execute the 
strategy. The resources would be recombined and distributed among the upper level to achieve 
the shared vision, including funding, social network and expertise (See Figure 4).  
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On the other hand, the frontline level applied a different structural approach. During the same 
Monday meeting, frontline level representatives would bring up exploitative based strategic 
objectives through applying a bottom-up approach. The senior team would undergo learning 
process about how the company can achieve incremental gains (exploitative strategic gains) 
based on existing business lines through hearing the plans suggested by lower level. As the 
frontline level of firm B addressed their concerns, “The market is intense and always has been 
changing. We need to make sure we are always ahead of our competitors and expand our 
current market share.” After the frontline level proposed their exploitative plan during the 
meeting, then the startup firm would form a consensus on the exploitative plan followed by the 
same execution process.  
One distinction is that the lower level was structured independently, as resources were 
usually shared within each department instead of across all frontline levels. With the distinctive 
structure, the firm could monitor the performance of each department to ensure the firm’s 
competing at its best. Within each of the department, the reward system was put in place to 
encourage mutual adjustment among each functional department (See Figure 4). The team 
strategic objective could be achieved and in turn increased the direct interests of their own 
department and created collective benefit after teamwork efforts. Furthermore, the framework 
would increase the impact of learning process and encouraging potential exploitative strategies. 
The explorative and exploitative objectives were integrated later in the process to encourage 
healthy competition between each department. 
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Figure 4: Specific Building Blocks of Strategies Implemented by Startups 
 
The structural and cultural differences drove the two management levels to have different 
strategic focuses, as the organization was capable of mastering both adaptability to changing 
business environment and excellence in daily operations. Knowing these startup firms have the 
conditions of both components (exploitation and exploration) of ambidexterity, the key for the 
ambidexterity framework to work was integrating the firm strategy to achieve the optimal 
balance between both approaches, which will be discussed in the next section on strategy 
integration process model.  
 
How can startups in China effectively integrate strategies to balance the tension between 
explorative and exploitative approaches? 
Theoretical Framework: Strategy Integration Process Model 
During the follow-up phone calls with both upper and lower management level of the 
sample firms, I asked and observed the strategy integration process of combining explorative and 
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exploitative approaches within the firm: “How exactly does the startup firm integrate the upper 
and lower level?” Table 8 illustrated the data from follow-up phone calls with both executive and 
frontline levels within the startups and relevant archival sources associated with the quotes and 
underlying themes. 
 
Table 8: Representative Data Supporting Interpretations of Strategic Integration Process 
Across All Management Levels (Executive and Employee Level) 
 Common Mechanisms for Strategy Integration Process 
 Cognitive Model Strategy & Planning 
Department 
Reward System 
Definition Establishment of 
common 
organizational 
identity  
Overcome trade-offs 
between redirecting 
firm strategy and 
maintaining core firm 
focus 
Well-performed 
employees exposed to 
both approaches 
Rationale Integrate “who we 
are?” concept as an 
overall firm to 
increase firm loyalty 
and pride 
 
Strategic intention to 
redirect firm strategy 
and balance between 
two dimensions of 
ambidexterity 
Reward system put in 
place to increase 
social integration 
among employee and 
executive level 
Example from Firm 
A 
“In our company, 
everyone is asked to 
do what they are best 
at and we 
communicate well.” 
 
 
 
 
-CAO 
“I think the resource 
integration ability 
and communication 
skills of the strategy 
department is key to 
our firm 
development.” 
 
 
-VP of strategy & 
planning department 
“I think our firm 
structure gives us 
many advantages. 
Each department is 
rewarded based on 
performance and we 
all work towards one 
common goal.” 
 
-Employee of human 
resources 
Example from Firm 
B 
“Our firm really 
focused on 
developing a 
collectivistic culture 
and promoting that 
idea of different roles 
under one firm.” 
“The strategy and 
planning department 
gives us many 
advantages as we 
apply what we are 
best at to excel in the 
market.” 
“I think resource 
sharing ability and 
communication skills 
are essential to our 
firm’s reward 
system.” 
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-CEO 
 
-Employee of 
strategy department 
-Employee of 
marketing department 
Example from Firm 
C 
“In recent years, the 
firm focused on 
improving 
communications 
within the firm to 
achieve full 
integration of the 
firm” 
 
 
 
-Director of academic 
resources department 
“We invested heavily 
in our strategy 
department that 
focused on 
communication 
strategy. It’s 
important to keep 
everyone informed 
with our decisions at 
all time.” 
 
 
-CEO 
“The leadership of 
the firm is essential 
as everyone is 
rewarded for 
contributing to the 
firm and helping the 
firm to adapt to the 
market changes, 
which is crucial.” 
 
-Employee of 
strategy & planning 
department 
 
The integration process was key to ensure the firm was able to achieve ambidexterity after 
identifying and balancing the tensions between the two approaches. During the first stage of data 
collection, existing literature has questioned the success of ambidexterity in real world business 
settings. For example, Christensen (1997) argued that firms cannot both exploit and explore and 
must spin-out their exploratory business to succeed. Other scholars (Taylor & Helfat, 2009) have 
argued that there is a trade-off between exploitative and explorative approaches, as firms cannot 
achieve future gains at the cost of today (operational failure) as well as only focusing on current 
profitability (failure of adaptability).  
After analyzing the data from Table 8, the major strategic concern for startup firms was the 
need to eliminate challenges associated with balancing between explorative and exploitative 
approaches. After analyzing the data collected, a common pattern was found where the startup 
ventures in China often followed the structural ambidexterity model, where there were separate 
structures or departments for different types of activities; where parts of the process were either 
solely aligned or solely adaptive; and where employees have clear mandates that rewarded them 
accordingly. Since the upper and lower levels of the firm were structurally and culturally 
 Cecca Xu  40 
 
 
different, to resolve the differences and encourage communication across the whole startup: there 
was the establishment of a cognitive model to form common identity, a strategy department to 
communicate all strategy design and implementation updates, and a reward system to further 
increase social integration (See Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Strategy Integration Process Model 
 
To synthesize all parts of the process model together, the firm’s goal was to increase the 
interaction between two levels of management: executive and frontline level in order to integrate 
all strategies together to stay competitive (See Figure 5). Figure 5 is an expansion based on the 
concepts introduced in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The two strategic approaches (explorative and 
exploitative) from both levels are integrated at the firm level, with three common mechanisms 
that were organizational design elements, in order to achieve ambidexterity.  
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First, the firm formed a cognitive model to establish common firm identity as in “who we 
are?” as an overall firm. The Chinese firm culture placed a huge emphasis on building collective 
organizational culture, especially the diversity existed among the lower and upper level. During 
the data collection process, as the interviewees from firm B mentioned, “Our firm really focused 
on developing a collectivistic culture and promoting that idea of different roles under one firm.” 
The formation of cognitive model with the emphasis on collective identity was essential to the 
strategy integration process. Through creating a collective identity among all levels, the firm was 
able to increase the success of ambidexterity.  
The findings aligned with theories brought up by existing literature. Strong organizational 
culture framework increased the strength of ambidexterity. Identity formation was the central 
part of culture framework as firms defined “who we are” and positioned to frame strategy and 
communicate that strategy across all firm levels. A cognitive model was put in place to create 
holistic understanding of firm strategy, which was used to speed up strategy formation process 
(Taylor & Helfat, 2009). The cognitive model used within firm’s strategy was based on the 
firm’s prior business model but with extra information on new strategy being added to refine the 
cognitive model. 
Second, after speaking with executives from the sample startups, a new department known as 
“Strategy & Planning” is either already existed or in the process of establishment within the three 
startup firms. Strategy departments were established among these startup ventures to achieve the 
optimal balance and to overcome the trade-off between these two dimensions. For example, one 
of the executives of firm C highlighted, “We invested heavily in our strategy department that 
focused on communication strategy. It’s important to keep everyone informed with our decisions 
at all time.” Therefore, the major role of the strategy department was to communicate both 
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explorative and exploitative approaches, ultimately achieving the optimal balance between these 
two dimensions. That way, the department ensured that the firm was able to redirect its strategy 
while maintaining the core firm focus and culture. Even though each level had its own strategic 
focus, but an overall firm strategic intent helped to justify the importance of both focuses and in 
turn increased the success of ambidexterity.  
To further enhance the strategy integration process, the firms utilized an incentive system 
where highly motivated individuals with exceptional performance from the frontline level were 
able to join the strategy department. Besides the reward within each department, the incentive 
system was set up to ensure that those well-performed employees are exposed to both 
dimensions alternately. For example, an employee spending two years in finance division would 
be given the opportunity to move on to the strategy & planning department, gaining experience 
in strategies to achieve long term profitability while applying his experience in financial 
operation area (exploration approach experience). The incentive system was aimed to increase 
firm social integration between each level to ensure that both dimensions could be achieved. For 
example, the frontline level of firm noted, “I think our firm structure gives us many advantages. 
Each department is rewarded based on performance and we all work towards one common 
goal.” Figure 6 provided a theoretical framework on the strategy integration process after 
synthesizing all stages. Such the targeted integration allowed the startup ventures to increase 
success rate of ambidexterity after balancing the tensions between the two dimensions. 
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Figure 6: Putting Everything Together: Grounded Theoretical Model of Startup Strategy 
Integration Process3 
 
 
                                                 
 
3 Figure 6 is an expansion based on the concepts introduced in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The two strategic 
approaches from both levels are balanced at firm level with the three integration mechanisms. 
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Conclusions 
Initially, the research focused on the broad question of how startup firms strategized to 
achieve organizational ambidexterity. Based on the inductive multi-case study and the data 
collected from fieldwork, this research extended to examining the fundamental differences 
between each firm management level, in terms of culture and structure. The context of Chinese 
startup firms achieving ambidexterity gains invited this study to look at how startups integrate 
various strategies to resolve the trade-offs between strategic approaches (exploration vs 
exploitation), ultimately providing a theoretical framework that synthesized all stages of the 
integration process. The overseas experience drove the executive level’s strategic focus towards 
changing-the-business model; the local education backgrounds pushed the frontline level to 
focus on running-the-business model with the independent structure.  
To integrate these two approaches together, I find that startups commonly employ three 
mechanisms: (1) at the cognitive level, startups form a collectivist organizational identity so that 
employees with different roles still feel that they are all working towards the same common end-
goal; (2) at the organizational structure level, startups use some variation of a "Strategy & 
Planning" department to manage the functional processes of redirect firm strategy while 
maintaining core firm focus; and (3) at the organizational design level, startups construct reward 
systems to align incentives for strategic integration within the startup. This unique approach 
enables each of employees to maximize their resources and capabilities, thus pushing the firm to 
sustain its competitive advantage. 
Grounded in the context of China’s education technology landscape, this study’s findings 
are significant as it advanced the understanding of strategy design, implementation and 
integration model utilized by startups. With the amount of qualitative data collected from 
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intensive field work to dive inside the “black box” of the firm, this paper provides a deep, 
process-oriented view on how startups integrate conflicting tensions (exploration vs exploitation) 
to achieve long-term success in nascent markets.  
There are several limitations to this study: The findings of the study may or may not be 
applicable to other cultural settings or markets. For example, North American or European 
markets might employ different strategy integration processes, as they have different 
organizational culture framework and work practices, etc. A second limitation is that the study’s 
approach is an inductive one based on developing rather than testing a theoretical framework; 
further quantitative data is needed to test the findings that I proposed. Lastly, the sample size of 
three startup ventures can be further expanded to identify other potential patterns relating to a 
startup’s strategy integration process as well as the nature of ambidexterity. 
I hope that with the growth of quantitative “big data”, the theoretical framework that I 
present can be tested in future research. Hopefully future research will also explore these ideas 
further by studying other cultural contexts, providing further attention on the strategy integration 
processes, and uncovering additional integration mechanisms associated with achieving firm 
ambidexterity.  
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Appendix I: Sample Confidentiality Form 
Startup Strategy Research Study Confidentiality Form 
Jan 1, 2019 
You are being invited to participate in a research study about startup strategy. This research 
project is being conducted by University of Michigan Ross School of Business. The objective of 
this research project is to attempt to understand how startups implement and integrate strategies 
to stay competitive in the market. The survey is being given to current employees all these 
startup companies.  
There are no known risks if you decide to participate in this research study, nor are there any 
costs for participating in the study. The information you provide will help me understand how 
best to satisfy the needs of organizations and the needs of employees. The information collected 
may not benefit you directly, but what I learn from this study should provide general benefits to 
employees, companies, and researchers to the relevant field. 
This survey is anonymous. If you choose to participate, do not write your name on the form. No 
one will be able to identify you, nor will anyone be able to determine which company you work 
for. No one will know whether you participated in this study. Nothing you say in this study will 
in any way influence your present or future employment with your company. Your participation 
in this study is voluntary. If you choose to participate, please send your completed form to the 
researcher.  
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the form or about being in this study, 
you may contact me at (904) 294-0719 or at4.   
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